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Abstract
The 2 × 2 matrix game plays a central role in the teaching and exposition
of game theory. It is also the source of much experimentation and research
in political science, social psychology, biology and other disciplines. This brief
paper is addressed to answering one intuitively simple question without going
1
into the many subtle qualifications that are there. How effi cient is the non-
cooperative equilibrium? This is part of a series of several papers that address
many of the qualifications concerning the uses of the 2 X 2 matrix games.
JEL Classifications: C63, C72, D61
Keywords: 2×2 matrix games, index,
1 The 2× 2 Matrix Games with Cardinal Payoffs
In the folklore and elementary education of game theory the 2× 2 matrix game has
played a special role. Several of these games bear special names such as The Prisoner’s
Dilemma, The Stag Hunt, and the Battle of the Sexes. There are only 144 strategically
different 2 × 2 games with strictly ordinal preferences. We are often interested in
considering related games with cardinal preferences and a moment’s consideration
shows that there is an indefinite number of these games. Many applications make
it desirable to examine a large but finite set of 2× 2 games with specific numbers of
highly different sizes. In a different paper we suggest how to do this [4]. This paper
utilizes all the 144 games listed in Appendix 2 as they serve to give a suffi ciently
exhaustive coverage of all 2 × 2 games to be able to get a feeling for the effi ciency
of noncooperative and some other behaviors without delving into a more refined
apparatus as we do in [11].
2 Outcome Sets
The 2× 2 matrix game with strictly ordinal payoffs may be cardinalized by 4 > 3 >
2 > 1 . We may study the strictly ordinal set of games utilizing just the symbols
1, 2, 3, 4 1.
Two of the top desirable properties of a good society are effi ciency and fairness,
they can only be defined after the assumptions concerning preferences have been
made.
2.1 Fairness and effi ciency
Fairness cannot be defined before the initial conditions are spelled out. The full
specification of initial conditions requires the assumptions made about innate prop-
erty rights of individuals. Symmetry involves the consideration of intrinsic property
rights. These are discussed elsewhere[3], [6],[1],[5],. Here we concentrate only on
effi ciency,which amounts to considering how close actual outcomes are to a jointly
maximal payoff.
1or a, b, c, d or any other icons.
2
3 Behavior and Structure
We consider and contrast several other behaviors beyond noncooperative behavior.
Metaphorically we consider four player types described as: The individualist; the
pessimist; the optimist or idealist; and the know-nothing, zero-intelligence or fool or
entropic player.
The Entropic Player : The Entropic player is the player that always acts or
chooses a strategy uniformly at random2.
MaxMax(P1+P2): The MaxMax Player is the player who always chooses the
strategy for which the maximum social welfare is achieved. Call her MaxMax or
the Utopian Player. she acts as if she will do the right thing and knows the other
will do so3. The player makes one simple inference about what the the other player
will do.
MaxsMins̄P1: is defensive he assumes the other side is out to damage him. We
may call the playersMaxMin or pessimistic.
A Noncooperative Equilibrium player or NEP assumes that she faces a
player motivated like herself. This behavior can be described by two parallel maxi-
mizing equations 4.
We consider a pair of noncooperative players playing each other and also contrast
their performance with three other pairs of player types playing four specially named
games, We then consider all 144 games in aggregate and broken into four structural
categories now noted.








Frequency of maximal wealth
The 36 games with a joint wealth of 8 each can be called ‘Games of coordination’.
There is a single cell with value (4, 4) that is a natural point of attraction.
The 6 games with joint maximum equal to 5 are games of pure opposition. There
is no potential opportunity for individual gain from collaboration. The games with
a joint maximum of 6 or 7 are mixed motive games where gains can be made by
2He is a syntactic agent whose distinguishes structure but is unable to interpret content or the
semantics.
3If there is more than one joint maximum a selection rule is needed.
4As is noted in [4] there are several tehnical details that must be considered concerning how to
handle multiple equilibria. We need to obtain higher and lower bounds on eficiency,
3
coordination and collaboration. We note that the modal wealth of the four types is
7.
3.1 Effi ciency and behavior
The work presented here on all possible worlds is made under a considerable heap
of assumptions with no comment on the trade-offs between effi ciency and symmetry.
This problem is considered elsewhere. Furthermore we consider only ‘pure popula-
tions’where agents are matched only against agents of the same type. Except for
one illustrative example, players of different types being matched against each other
are considered elsewhere [?], [12]. The mixed, more complex approach is congenial
with evolutionary game theory[2].5
3.1.1 Inference and pure believers
We carry out our evaluation for the pairs of four types on four specific named games
that we call prisoner’s dilemma, stag hunt, battle of the sexes and best of all possible
2 × 2 worlds and then on all of the 144 games categorized into several segments
as noted below. In doing so contrast between structure and behavior emerge as do
contrasts among different structures and behaviors.
The first game is the prisoner’s dilemma
1 2
1 3, 3 1, 4
2 4, 1 2, 2
Table 2
Prisoner’s dilemma
Two numbers are given in each cell in the table below. They are the payoff to the









5There are several excellent texts on evolutionary game theory such as [13] that approach game
dynamics in terms of competition among species rather than conscious optimization.
4
We see immediately MaxmaxEntropyMaxmin∼NCE. Thus do-gooders are
first with 6, next random with 5, followed by the cautious and individualist with 4 in
this structurally worst 2× 2 world.
The second game is the stag hunt
1 2
1 4, 4 1, 3
2 3, 1 2, 2
Table 4
Stag hunt
There is a coordination problem with the NCE for both the battle of the sexes
and stag hunt. As they have two NCEs and the battle of the sexes has two JM as
well, for each some form of tie-breaking rule is required. This is not a problem in
pure logic. It requires an extra assumption. The diffi culty can be avoided here by
defining and considering three types of NCE players NCE1, NCE2, and NCE3,one
for each equilibrium outcome and similarly JM1 and JM2 for different joint maxima.












1 4, 4 1, 2
2 2, 1 3, 3
Table 6
Stag hunt with the NCE players NCE1, NCE2.
We see immediately Individualist type 1 and idealists are tied at first, fools
or entropic players are second and last are individualists type 2 and the cautious.
Maxmax∼NCE1 EntropyMaxmin∼NCE2.
The third game is the battle of the sexes, again there is a problem with two PSNE
1 2
1 4, 3 1, 2
2 2, 1 3, 4
Table 7










Battle of the sexes
The do-gooders, individualists and cautious are all optimal and fools are last.
Maxmax1 ∼Maxmax2 ∼NCE1 ∼Maxmin∼NCE2 Entropy.
The fourth game is the best of all possible worlds game
1 2
1 4, 4 3, 2
2 2, 3 1, 1
Table 9
Best of all possible 2× 2 worlds
We see immediately that the individualists, do-gooders and conservatives are equal








1 4, 4 3, 2
2 2, 3 1, 1
Table 14
Indvidualists, cautious and do-gooders are first and fools last in the best of all
possible 2× 2 worlds.
Maxmax∼NCE∼MaxminEntropy
The summation of rankings is
Games Domination
PD JMENTNCCAUT
Stag hunt JM∼NCE1 ENTCAUT∼NCE2




PD = Prisoner’s dilemma; BS = Battle of sexes; BOPW = Best of all possible
worlds
3.1.2 Some lessons on structure and behavior
The effi ciency indices for the four games above appear to show
• In the best of all possible worlds structure guides all pairs of players to Opti-
mality except for the fools.
• In the PD or worst of all possible worlds the idealists do well (but it is knife-
edged as noted below), the ignorant are next best and the ‘rational’and cautious
actors have the worst outcome. Structure goes against individualistic behavior.
• When there is the possibility of more than one equilibrium the problems of
coordination become critical. If all are behaviorally cooperative a convention
is still needed for coordination
We enlarge our evaluation for the combinations of four types of players matched














We see immediately the NCE versus ENT or JM or NCE or MinMax has an
average yield of ((2 + 3 + 4 + 2) /4) = 11/4, ENT gives ((1.5 + 2.5 + 3.5 + 1.5) /4) =
9/4 , JM or MaxMax gives ((1 + 2 + 3 + 1) /4) = 7/4 and MinMax or cautious yields
6In a one shot game each individual does not have the opportunity to learn about the player type
she faces. A reasonable prior is that it is someone similar; alternatively one might wish to contrast
true belevers with agnostics where all have the common belief that the competitor could, with equal
probability be any of the four types (note [1]).
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(2 + 2 + 4 + 2) = 10/4 . Thus selfish is first with 2.75, cautious next with 2.5, followed
by random with 2.25 and do-gooders last with 1.75 in this structurally worst 2 × 2
world.
We note that depending on structure and the behavior of others, fools may gain or
lose from the damage of their blunders Here the fools hurt themselves against realists
or pessimists, but gain considerably if they play against idealists or do-gooders.
3.1.3 A note on viability and environment
The purpose of these tedious but simple calculations (at least to us) is to show
both the gains and the dangers from going between the descriptive words and their
simple mathematical representations. If not interpreted too literally they can show
when fools hurt themselves more or less than they hurt others. They show where
the idealists shine in the best of all possible worlds but can be taken advantage of
otherwise. In even these few instances there appear to be examples of ‘anything
goes’. In the context of one period with no social learning the individualistic and
the cautious (maxmin) behaviors appear as the most viable. In Section 3.2.3 and
Appendix 1 we make this more precise over all 2× 2 games.
The four games were structurally highly different and we could safely observe that
the viability of the different agents varied with the environment, and we considered
different types of agent matched against each other.
In our last set of comparisons we consider the whole set of 144−6 games that can
be considered as societies with joint gain available
We limit ourselves to two crude measures. The first uses the ratio of the joint









We do not dwell on the many index construction problems here7. We nevertheless
make a case for crude estimates of the gap between different behaviors and an ideal
collaboration. Appendix 1 gives the calculations for all 144 games for joint maximum,
the best and worst noncooperative equilibria, the maxmin or pessimist players and
the entropy players.
7We discuss better measures involving both effi ciency and symmetry elsewhere [4] that provide
simple upper and lower bounds and note a somewhat more sophisticated index involving in its
determination of a zero point the Nash axioms for noncomparable but measurable utility.
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3.2 Effi ciency Measures in All 2× 2 games
The summary of the final calculations given in Appendix 1 are presented here broken
into the four natural classes then breaking them into the three classes n = 8, 7, 6 and
5.
3.2.1 Games of coordination: n = 8
There are 36 games of coordination where each pair has the opportunity to select an
outcome of (4, 4).
JM NCEH NCEL MXMN ENT WORST
Total 288 288 264 224 180 144
Eff1 1 1 .92 .78 .63 .50
Eff2 1 1 .83 .56 .25 0
Table 17
Games of coordination
The structure offers a natural signal for optimal coordination, but with Index1 on
the average the worst noncoperative equilibrium misses by 8%. The cautious leave
22% and the fools 37%.
The Index2 is possibly more reasonable inasmuch as it is anchored on the gains
above the worst outcome. On the average the worst noncooperative equilibrium
misses by 17%. The cautious leave 44% and the fools 75%.
3.2.2 Mixed motive games 1: n = 7
There are 60 mixed motive games with n = 7. These are the modal structure.
JM NCEH NCEL MXMN ENT WORST
Total 420 388 372 368 300 176
Eff1 1 .92 .89 .88 .71 .42
Eff2 1 87 .80 .79 .51 0
Table 18
Mixed motive games 1
The structure highlights the need for collaboration in face of no universal easy
coordination in the structure. Index1 on the average has the best noncooperative
equilibrium miss by 8% the worst noncooperative equilibrium misses by 11%. The
cautious leave 12% on the table and the fools 29%.
The Index2 yields for the best noncooperative equilibrium a miss of 13% the
average worst noncooperative equilibrium misses by 20%. The cautious leave 21%
and the fools 49%.
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3.2.3 Mixed motive games 2: n = 6
There are 42 mixed motive games with n = 6. They have less fat to fight over than
those previously noted.
JM NCEH NCEL MXMN ENT WORST
Total 252 236 236 236 210 144
Eff1 1 .94 .94 .94 .83 .57
Eff2 1 .85 .85 .85 .61 0
Table 19
Mixed motive games 2
Index1 on the average has the best noncooperative equilibrium, the worst non-
cooperative equilibrium and the cautious all leave 7% on the table and the fools
17%.The Index2 yields the same for best noncooperative equilibrium worst nonco-
operative equilibrium and the cautious all leave 15% and the fools 39%
3.2.4 Games of pure opposition: n = 5
There are only 6 mixed motive games with n = 5. They have a pure opposition of
interests as is noted in Table 20
JM NCEH NCEL MXMN ENT WORST
Total 30 30 30 30 30 30
Eff1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Eff2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 20
Paradoxically the handful of constant sum games with a joint maximum of 5 have
every outcome as Pareto optimal thus to include them in a measure primarily aimed
at considering joint gains in a society is misleading. The intent operators NCE,
MaxMax, Maxmin all collapse to yielding the same behavior in a two person
Hobbsian constant sum world.
3.2.5 All mixed motive games: Index2
Table 21 displays the values of the second index over all games with mixed motives
JM NCEH NCEL MXMN ENT WORST
n=7 1 .87 .8 .79 .51 0
n=6 1 .85 .85 .85 .61 0
1 .86 .82 .81 .55 0
Table 21
10
The bounds on the average effi ciency of purely individualistic behavior appear to
be between at least 14% and at most 18% with purely defensive behavior coming in
close at 19%
3.2.6 Fools matter
Looking over the various games and solutions damage done by the ignorant varies.
We may regard all non learning purely syntactic players as being societally tone deaf.
The other players may or may not be concerned with how much the ignorant
damage themselves, but it is easy to produce games where the fools damage others
as well as themselves. The clever game theorist, can easily cook up examples where
it pays the cunning to play the fool, but often fools are fools.
3.2.7 Being Nice matters in context
In various outcomes here always being intrinsically cooperative does not pay. When
the structure is as the best of all possible worlds joint maximality is coaxed out of all
syntactic,non-malicious player types modeled here.
In philosophical writings we have the realism and skepticism of Hobbes and
Voltaire contrasting with the fuzzy-headedness mythology of the original perfect
primitive world of the trendy salon speaker Rousseau. The more realistic view ap-
pears to be that of Hume where the social individual is cooperative but no fool. In
order to start to do justice to such a player we would need at least two plays where
learning can begin. It is here where a tit-for-tat player can be considered. The one
ply does not permit flexibility but the two ply opens up a manageable set of minimal
learning possibilities
4 Costs, Coordination and Cooperation
• Civilization, culture, society and law move on broader and slower time scales
than everyday life and almost all of the individual consumer and worker eco-
nomic and political activities.
• Effi ciency and symmetry are critical features of everyday life.
• The construction of indices are critical for the measurements of deviations from
effi ciency and symmetric treatment of individuals
• Threats play a key role in considering what the zero point should be on any
index understanding the implications of comparable utility is merited first.
We do not live in the utopian best of all possible worlds and do not live in purely
dystopian structures. We have rich or not so rich mixed motive structures. The
11
models of the noncooperative and cautious or pessimistic agents are metaphors for
decentralized behavior. But the behavior is within the structure of the rules of the
game. The departure from Optimality appears to range from a low of around 15
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2 13 8 1 4 4
2 2 2 3
2 711
3
3 3 2 312 6 1
7 8 2
0 210 7 2
2.5 2.5 0 36 6 0
0 1
16 7 1 3 4 1
4 2 2
15 8
4 1 25 7 1 3
1 2 4 2 2
1 3
1 4
1 4 4 1 18 8
21 6




1 3 3 1 36
23
4 6
2 1 29 7 1 3
1 4 2 1 3
17 7 1 4 3
11 5 1 3 2 2
14 6 1 4
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7 Appendix 2: 144 games 
Appendix 2
Row Col.
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0 141 8 2
43 6 1 2
0 339 6 0 2.5 2.5
2 3




30 7 1 3 4 2
4 1 227 7 1 3
1 2
1
4 2 234 7 1 3
1 3 4 2 233 7
1 2
1 4 3 1 236
28 8 1 4 4 2
1 324 6 1 3
31 6 1 3




2 126 8 1 4
3 2 3
4 1 142 8 1 4






32 8 1 4 4 2
6 1
4
25 6 1 3 2 2
3 2 223 7 1 4
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(1,1) (4,2) 4 2
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51 7 1 4 3 1
53 6 2
0 155
0 459 5 0 2.5 2.5










48 8 1 4 4 1
1
47 7 1 4
6 1 3




45 6 1 2 4 1
2.5
2.5 2.5
60 6 1 3 3 1
3 1 358




2 1 256 7 1 3
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0 178 8 2
87 7 1 3
1 3 4 2 2
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0 169 8 2
2.5 2.5 0 372 6 0
0 2
80 7 1 3 4 1
4 1 279 7 1 3























68 7 1 4 3 1 2
77 8 1 4 4 1
4 1 170
3 2 281 7 1 4
1 4 3 1 273 7
1
83 8 1 4
1 4 4 1 182 8
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0 274 7 2
388 6 1 3 2 1
1 4 4 1 1
84 6 1 3 3 1
4 2 1
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99 6 1 3
110 7 1 2 3 1
4 1108 6
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0 2129 7 2
0 1122 8 2
0 2126 7 0 2.5 2.5
2.5 2.5 0 2130 6 0
2
4 2 3
4 1 2125 7 1 3
1 2 3 2 4120 5
0 1
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116 7 1 2 2
4 1 1113 8 1 4
4 4 1 1111




131 8 1 4
3 3 1 3127 6 1
1 4 3 1 2
1 2119 7 1 4
1 3 4 1
118 6 1 2 3
1 1132 8 1 4 4
4 1 1
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(2,4) (3,2) 2 4
(1,2) (4,4) 4 4









Game # corresponds to the numbering system established in the companion paper
Payoff Matrix gives the normal form of each game with payoffs listed as (row payoff, column payoff)
Shape corresponds to the shape of the payoff set's convex hull as shown in Appendix 1
Joint Max gives the highest possible combined payoff for the two players
Symmetric is marked "Sym" if the game is symmetric, otherwise it is left blank
Nash Payoff lists the payoffs of the noncooperative equilibrium
if there are two equilibria with different payoff sums, the one with the highest sum is listed first
Dom. specifies the number of row and column strategies that are strictly dominated
Pareto Optima gives the number of payoff pairs that are Pareto optimal

























0 1140 8 2
133 7 2
0 2139 7 2
7
0 3144 6 0 2.5 2.5
2.5 2.5 0 2143 7 0
0 3
0 3134 6 0 2.5 2.5
0 3138 6 0 2.5 2.5
2.5 2.5
142 6 0 2.5 2.5
2.5 2.5 0 2141 7 0
0 2
0 4136 5 0
135
3 1 2137 7 1 4
1 4 3 1 2
23
